Chinmaya Kumar | Azim Premji University

About

I am an Assistant Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University in Bengaluru, India. My research lies at the intersection of development, political, labor, and behavioral economics, with a focus on identifying scalable interventions that enhance the effectiveness of public institutions and improve labor market outcomes.

A central strand of my work examines agency problems in public sector delivery and explores how complaint and monitoring systems can strengthen citizen engagement and improve state responsiveness. In parallel, I study the causes and consequences of underrepresentation of minorities in leadership roles across firms, bureaucracies, and elected bodies. More recently, I have begun a new line of research in labor economics, investigating firm behavior in informal labor markets, particularly the motivations behind hiring migrant workers and the structural barriers these workers face.

My research approach combines field experiments, survey methods, and administrative data, often in collaboration with civil society organizations and government partners.

My research projects have been funded by several organizations including NSF, J-PAL, BFI Development Economics Center, The Weiss Fund, IGC, and Azim Premji Foundation.

Primary fields: Development economics, Labor economics

Secondary fields: Behavioral economics, Political Economy

Research Papers

Kumar, Chinmaya, and M. R. Sharan. “Complaint Resolution Systems: Experimental Evidence from Rural India.” [PDF]

Abstract

We study whether access to complaint resolution systems can resolve hold-up problems in implementing public good projects. We run a field experiment involving 1629 low-caste local representatives who were unable to start public goods projects in their constituencies due to bureaucratic hurdles. We randomize offers to file complaints regarding public good project initiation on their behalf and track its effects. Our treatment leads to a 40 percentage points jump in complaint filing rate and is effective in improving project implementation: treated constituencies see a 26% rise in public good projects. We also find that the treatment increases project initiation in neighboring constituencies by 23%. Our analysis suggests that the mere threat of a formal complaint technology could cause project initiation in neighboring wards. However, resolution rates go down when multiple complaints are filed against the same higher bureaucrat. Surprisingly, treated representatives did not gain any electoral returns in the local elections held two years after the treatment..

M. R. Sharan, and Chinmaya Kumar. “The Distributional Consequences of Political Reservation.” [PDF]

Abstract

A key goal of affirmative action policies is to reduce disparities between disadvantaged minority groups and others. We study one such policy: mandated political representation in favor of low caste (Scheduled Castes/SC) groups in Bihar, India. Using a regression discontinuity design framework, we study how political reservation affects inter-group disparities in the short- and long-run. We show that political reservation in favor of SCs for the post of local government head (a) lowers SC-non-SC disparities in access to public goods in the short-run (5 years later) and long-run (13 years later), (b) lowers inter-group private asset inequality modestly in the short-run and substantially in the long-run (c) has no efficiency consequences in the short-run and (d) increases political participation and presence of low caste members in local government in the long-run. Turning to mechanisms, we show that government programs are better targeted towards low castes in reserved constituencies. Our results suggest a virtuous cycle between political representation and resource access, which reap significant benefits for minority groups in the long run.

“Distaste for Minority Employers: Experimental Evidence from India”

Abstract

Minorities are underrepresented in enterprise ownership and leadership positions. This paper investigates one potential cause: discrimination against minority employers by subordinate workers. Using a field experiment in the hiring process of a private Indian firm, I examine whether minority employers face bias in the quantity and quality of job applicants. The experiment randomized employer identity (minority vs. non-minority) and the disclosure of reference checks to test for social image concerns as a motive for discrimination. Results show that applicants assigned to a minority employer were 2.8 percentage points (10\%) less likely to accept interview offers, and the average quality of applicants—measured by educational attainment—was significantly lower. I find no evidence that social image concerns drive this discrimination, as reference checks had no differential effect. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that non-minority workers disproportionately discriminate against minority employers, while minority workers exhibit less bias.

Work in Progress

“Why do Firms Hire Migrant Workers?:Evidence from India”, with Varun Kapoor

Abstract

“Leader Led Growth: Social Identity and performance of Economic Enterprises in Rural India”, with M. R. Sharan

Abstract

Misallocation of entrepreneurial talent can prevent the economy from achieving its growth potential. Minority groups face discrimination across multiple markets – capital, product, labor – that limits the entry and growth of their enterprises. This paper empirically investigates whether exposure to low caste (Scheduled Castes/SC) leaders at the local level can help SC entrepreneurs overcome some of the barriers and improve the performance of their enterprises. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that exogenous exposure to SC leaders has a strong positive effect on the entry and growth of SC-run enterprises: There is a 20% increase in the number of enterprises and a 27% increase in workers employed by SC-owned enterprises. We find evidence for positive spillovers on mid-level caste groups (OBCs) but no effects on higher-caste groups. Using a primary survey of enterprises, we plan to uncover the underlying channels through which local leaders impact the performance of economic enterprises.

“Strengthening Citizen Led Monitoring: Experimental Evidence from India”, with Aaditya Dar and M. R. Sharan

“Bargaining Out of Poverty? Experimental Evidence on Income Shocks and Pricing Behavior of Microentrepreneurs in India”, with Varun Kapoor

Pre-doctoral Publications

“Cash versus Kind: Understanding the Preferences of the Bicycle-Programme Beneficiaries in Bihar”, (with Maitreesh Ghatak and Sandip Mitra). Economic and Political Weekly of India, Vol. 51, Issue No. 11, 12 Mar, 2016, p. 51-60.

Teaching

Political Economy of Development (PhD), Spring 2021 and Spring 2022, Teaching Assistant for Prof. James Robinson and Prof. Chris Blattman

Advanced Microeconomics (PhD), Winter 2020, Teaching Assistant for Prof. Damon Jones

Order and Violence (MPP), Spring 2019, Teaching Assistant for Prof. Chris Blattman

Microeconomics (Undergraduate), Fall 2018, Teaching Assistant for Prof. Kerwin Charles

Work with me

Current Job Opportunity: [Research Associate]